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THE FATE OF CONGRESSIONAL BUSINESS INQUIRY -
U.S. v. WELDEN
By KARL JAY SEIF*
American business activities during the past century have ex-
panded greatly in magnitude and complexity. To meet the problems
occasioned by modern corporate enterprise expansion, Congress has
enacted encompassing legislation to regulate the course and conduct
of American business. In 1890, Congress enacted the first antitrust
statute - The Sherman Act.' This Act:
"was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
material progress, while at the same time providing an environment
conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and
social institutions."1
2
To supplement the broad general Sherman Act prohibitions, Con-
gress has enacted various antitrust and trade regulatory laws embody-
ing a more definitive regulation of business conduct.' In a sentence it
may be stated that the antitrust laws are intended to protect and pro-
mote free and fair competition in business.
Congressional committees and subcommittees conduct inquiries
and subpoena witnesses and documents for the purpose of gathering
information to assist Congress in enacting, amending, repealing and
modifying legislation. A continuous flow of reliable current informa-
tion is essential to Congress. Testimony and documents of private
* Attorney, Federal Trade Commission. A.B. 1959, University of Maryland;
LL.B. 1961, University of Maryland. Member of the Baltimore City and Maryland
Bars. (The opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and are not in-
tended as expressions of those of the Federal Trade Commission.)
1. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1958).
2. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
3. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1958); the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27(1958) ; and the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
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citizens and corporations are a primary source of this necessary infor-
mation. In the public interest a citizen may be compelled to testify
and produce documents, even though it subjects him to painful incon-
venience, and possibly embarrassment or notoriety.4 The power to
compel testimony from a witness is a valuable instrument in obtaining
essential information, but to protect against abuse of that power,
the Fifth Amendment safeguards the individual against, among other
things, self-incrimination. 5
Congress, recognizing the fundamental importance of the testi-
mony of private citizens, has in turn acted by passing legislation that
compels a witness to testify in exchange for immunity from subsequent
prosecution. By enacting immunity statutes Congress has taken
away the privilege of silence conferred by the Fifth Amendment and
furnished immunity as a substitute. However, the efforts of Congress
to gain access to essential information through the use of immunity
statutes has been severely hampered by the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Welden,6 decided April 20, 1964. The Court in
answering a question involving one of the earliest federal witness
immunity acts, The Act of February 25, 1903, 7 held that an immunity
provision of that Act, providing that no person shall be prosecuted
"on account of any transaction, matter, or thing" to which he testifies
"in any proceeding, suit, or prosecution", applied only to persons
testifying in judicial proceedings. Since the Act of February 25, 1903
applies only to witnesses testifying in judicial proceedings and not to
witnesses testifying in nonjudicial proceedings. Welden, a witness
before a subcommittee of the House Select Committee on Small Business o
was not immunized from subsequent prosecution arising from his testi-
mony before that committee.
Any comprehensive examination of the Welden decision necessi-
tates a discussion of the privilege against self-incrimination and warrants
a review of the legislative history of relevant federal witness im-
munity acts and judicial developments involving those enactments.
In examining the Welden opinion this article confines its detailed
analysis primarily to federal antitrust witness immunity statutes and
decisions.
4. Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 147 (1949) ; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591, 605 (1896).
5. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. In part this guarantees that "no person . . . shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
6. 377 U.S. 95 (1964).
7. The Act of February 25, 1903, 32 Stat. 854, 904 (1903), 15 U.S.C. § 32 (1958),
which provides:
"No person shall be prosecuted or be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for
or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify
or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, in any proceeding, suit, or prosecu-
tion under sections 1-7 of this title and all Acts amendatory thereof or supple-
mental thereto, and sections 8-11 of this title: Provided, That no person so
testifying shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for perjury com-
mitted in so testifying."
This was amended by the Act of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. 798 (1906), 15 U.S.C. § 33
(1958), which provides:
"Under the immunity provisions in section 32 of this title, immunity shall extend
only to a natural person who, in obedience to a subpoena, gives testimony under
oath or produces evidence, documentary or otherwise, under oath."
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THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Proclaimed as "one of the great landmarks in man's struggle
to make himself civilized,"" protection against self-incrimination has
become a part of our legal heritage. At common law no distinction
was drawn as to the type of proceeding in which the privilege was
applicable. It could be invoked in equity proceedings and common
law civil cases as well as in criminal prosecutions.' Despite the fact
that the Fifth Amendment specifically provides that "no person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,"'"
the Supreme Court has refused to confine the privilege to criminal
prosecutions." The privilege may be invoked in any proceeding, be it
criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, adjudicatory or investiga-
tory.'2 Since the privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature
of the proceedings in which testimony is sought or is to be used, it
may be claimed wherever the answer to a question might tend to expose
the person to criminal responsibility" or where the answer would
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.' 4 A real
danger of subsequent conviction must exist to justify a claim of the
privilege.'5 Remote contingencies will not be sustained under the
Fifth Amendment. It is for the court to determine whether silence is
justified.' 6 Purely personal, the privilege may not be used to protect
others from punishment and it is not available to a corporation.' 7
8. Griswold, THE Fn'rn AMENDMgNT TODAY (1955) 7; Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956).
9. See 8 Wigmore, EVIDENC" § 2250 for a discussion of the history of the common
law principle; and Note, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 21 VA. L. Rgv. 763 (1935).
10. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
11. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924); Cf. United States v. The
Saline Bank, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100 (1828).
In the case of Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892), the Supreme
Court rejected an argument that the privilege is confined to defendants in criminal
prosecutions and said: "The object was to insure that a person should not be com-
pelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might
tend to show that he himself had committed a crime." See also Corwin, The Supreme
Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MicH. L. tv. 1 (1930).
12. Specific proceedings, other than criminal, where the privilege has been held
to be applicable are congressional investigations, Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155
(1955) ; grand jury proceedings, Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950) ; Counsel-
man v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); bankruptcy proceedings, McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924); preliminary hearings, Wood v. United States, 128
F.2d 265 (1942) (preliminary hearing in Police Court) ; and administrative proceed-
ings, Graham v. United States, 99 F.2d 746 (1938) (before Inspector of the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service), Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
13. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
14. In Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951), the Court stated:
"The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support
a conviction . . . but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain
of evidence needed to prosecute. .. ."
15. Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 935-36 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 860 (1949).
16. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) ; Mason v. United States, 244
U.S. 362 (1917).
17. In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), it was argued that the protections of the
Fifth Amendment and the 1903 immunity statute were applicable to a corporation. The
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LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL
WITNESS IMMUNITY ACTS
The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit asking incriminating
questions, but provides only that a witness cannot be compelled to
answer unless a full substitute for the constitutional privilege is given."
Over a hundred years ago Congress, fully cognizant that a person
could impede the securing of necessary information by invoking the
Fifth Amendment privilege and refusing to answer questions essential
for a determination by a fact finding body, provided witnesses with
statutory immunity from subsequent prosecution in exchange for their
testimony.1 9 Immunity acts have as their purpose not a gift of amnesty
but a method of making "evidence available and compulsory that
otherwise could not be got.""0
Supreme Court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment privilege was purely personal to
the witness and not intended to be available to corporations. The Court declared:
"The Amendment is limited to a person who shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, and if he cannot set up the privilege of a third
person, he certainly cannot set up the privilege of a corporation. As the com-
bination or conspiracies provided against by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act can
ordinarily be proved only by the testimony of parties thereto, in the person of
their agents or employ~s, the privilege claimed would practically nullify the
whole act of Congress." 201 U.S. at 70.
For a general discussion of the privilege as applicable to corporations, see Annot.,
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 120 A.L.R. 1102 (1939).
By analogy the courts have extended the doctrine of corporate ineligibility to
compel the custodian of an unincorporated association's records to produce such asso-
ciation's books and records, even though their production might incriminate the asso-
ciation or the custodian personally. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944)(union records). Courts have been reluctant, however, to extend the White doctrine
to compel partners to produce the records of a partnership. Generally, these records
are protected by the privilege. United States v. Linen Service Council, 141 F. Supp.
511 (D.N.J. 1956) ; United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ; In re
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1948) ; United States v. Brasley,
268 F. 59 (W.D. Pa. 1920). Contra, United States v. Onassis, 133 F. Supp. 327
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
Federal and state governments may require certain businesses and professions to
make and keep records and reports of their activities. A list of some of the federal
regulatory statutes including such a record-keeping requirement may be found in
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (1948). These "private" records and
reports are not within the protection of the Fifth Amendment when the duty to keep
them has been validly imposed, and thus they are subject to compulsory production.
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 17 (1948).
18. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). The first witness immunity
statute to come before the Supreme Court was invalidated by this decision. A shipper
refused to answer a grand jury's questions concerning his dealings with certain rail-
roads on the ground that his answers might incriminate him. The Act of 1887, 24
Stat. 379 (1887), contained an immunity provision. The Supreme Court reversed a
contempt conviction, holding the statute unconstitutional because it did not afford the
witness the complete protection guaranteed by the Consitution.
19. The earliest federal statute involving immunity is the Act of January 24, 1857,
11 Stat. 155, as amended by the Act of January 24, 1862, 12 Stat. 333. For a list of
the federal witness immunity acts currently in force, see Note, The Federal Witness
Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading The Constitutional Tightrope, 72
YALE- L.J. 1568, 1611-12 (1963).
20. Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 142 (1913) (opinion by Holmes, J.)
contra, Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), where the Court in discussing
immunity acts said: "The act of Congress in question securing to witnesses immunity
from prosecution is virtually an act of general amnesty, and belongs to a class of legis-
lation which is not uncommon either in England... or in this country." 161 U.S. at 601.
Immunity once gained grants no license to violate the law perpetually. United
States v. Swift, 186 F. 1002 (N.D. Ill. 1911), cited with approval in United States
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The immunity acts must furnish something coextensive with the
privilege displaced, but they need not be broader.2 Congress has
enacted over 40 federal witness immunity acts2 2 and "every State,
without exception, has one or more immunity acts pertaining to cer-
tain offenses or legislative investigations.
2
The first Supreme Court decision sustaining the constitutionality
of a federal witness immunity act was Brown v. Walker,24 decided in
1896. Examining the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893,25 the Court
announced that, "in view of the constitutional provision, a statutory
enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future
prosecutions for the offense to which the question relates. The inference
from this language is that, if the statute does afford such immunity
against future prosecution, the witness will be compellable to testify". 26
Thus it is clear nothing short of absolute immunity will justify com-
pelling a witness to testify if he has claimed the privilege. Unless
the immunity granted is coextensive with the constitutional privilege
a witness may invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to give self-
incriminating testimony. Ever since Brown the Compulsory Testimony
v. Smith, 206 F.2d 905, 908 (3d Cir. 1953); and United States v. Johns-Mansville
Corporation, 213 F. Supp. 65, 75 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
The grant of immunity does not preclude punishment for perjury committed in
the course of the compelled testimony. Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142
(1911) ; see notes 36 and 41 infra, for examples of immunity statutes which include
provision for non-exemption from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed
when a witness testifies.
21. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). Federal witness immunity acts assist
Congress, federal and state tribunals, and governmental agencies to gain access by
compulsion to testimony and evidence otherwise unavailable. See Note, Fifth Amend-
ment and Federal Immunity Statutes, 22 Gto. WASH. L. Rrv. 447 (1954).
22. For an excellent discussion of the federal witness immunity acts, see Note.
72 YALn L.J. 1568, supra note 19. A collection of the federal witness immunity acts
currently in force appears on pp. 1611-12 of that Note. See generally 8 Wigmore,
EVIDENCt §§ 2190-93 (3d ed., rev. 1961); Lilienthal, The Power of Governmental
Agencies to Compel Testimony, 39 HARv. L. Riv. 694 (1926).
23. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964)
(concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White).
24. 161 U.S. 591 (1896). Brown, an auditor for a railroad company, had been
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury investigating charges that officers and agents
of the company had violated the Interstate Commerce Act. Brown invoked the
privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer questions concerning the
operations and rebate policy of the railroad. On being adjudged in contempt Brown
appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the 1893 immunity statute was uncon-
stitutional. The Court in rejecting Brown's arguments said: "While the constitutional
provision in question is justly regarded as one of the most valuable prerogatives of
the citizen, its object is fully accomplished by the statutory immunity, and we are,
therefore, of opinion that the witness was compellable to answer.... ." 161 U.S. at 610.
25. 27 Stat. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1958). This Act provides:
"No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing
books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements and documents before the Interstate
Commerce Commission, or in obedience to the subpoena of the Commission . .
on the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or
otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him or subject him to a penalty
or forfeiture. But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which
he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said Com-
mission, or in obedience to its subpoena, or the subpoena of either of them, or
in any such case or proceeding: Provided, That no person so testifying shall be
exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying."
26. 161 U.S. at 594.
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Act of 1893 has been part of our constitutional fabric and has been
included in substantially the same terms in almost all of the major
federal regulatory enactments. 27
Brown not only resolved any doubts Congress may have had
concerning the constitutionality of federal witness immunity acts, but
also assured Congress of the Supreme Court's agreement that im-
munity acts are essential for the enforcement of federal regulatory
measures.2" With these doubts resolved, Congress moved rapidly
to enact additional immunity acts, modeled after The Compulsory
Testimony Act of 1893 provision applicable to proceedings under the
Interstate Commerce Act. 9 Congress, in February, 1903, as part of the
legislative program for the correction of corporate abuses, enacted three
separate measures that included similar immunity provisions: (1)
the General Appropriation Act of February 25, 1903,"0 providing
for the compulsion of testimony in all proceedings brought under
the antitrust laws; (2) the Act of February 14, 1903," 1 establishing
the Department o, Commerce and Labor, and conferring upon the
Commissioner of Corporations the same investigatory powers pos-
sessed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and specifically in-
corporating by reference the immunity provisions of The Compulsory
Testimony Act of February 11, 1893 ;32 and (3) the Elkins amendment
of February 19, 1903,'3 to the Interstate Commerce Act.
In 1914, Congress created the Federal Trade Commission to cope
with the then evident inadequacy of the federal courts' enforcement
of the Sherman Act.3 4 Under Section 9 of the Federal Trade Com-
27. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956) ; Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1, 6 (1948).
28. See Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, supra note 19, at 1575:
"Congress, interpreting this decision [Brown] as laying to rest any doubts as to
the constitutionality of immunity acts and as indicating the Court's agreement that
such acts are essential to the enforcement of regulatory legislation, moved to
adopt immunity legislation in connection with other federal regulatory activities."
29. 8 Wigmore, EVIDENCZ§§ 2190-93 (3d ed., rev. 1961) ; Lilienthal, supra note 22.
30. 32 Stat. 904 (1903), 15 U.S.C. § 32 (1958).
31. 32 Stat. 827 (1903), 15 U.S.C. § 175 (1958).
32. 27 Stat. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1958) ; see n.25 supra.
33. 32 Stat. 848 (1903), 49 U.S.C. § 42 (1958).
34. See, e.g., 51 CONG. Rzc. 13047 (1914); 51 CONG. 1REc. 8977 (1914). For a
discussion of the background of the Federal Trade Commission, see Henderson, THE
FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIssIoN, chs. I, VI (1924); Rublee, The Original Plan and
Early History of the Federal Trade Commission, 11 ACAD. POL. ScI. PROC. 666 (1926) ;
The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Trade Commission, 64 CoL. L. REv. 385-618(1964) ; Federal Trade Commission Silver Anniversary Issue, 8 GEo. WASH. L. Rgv.
249-748 (1940). See also F.T.C. v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 432 (1920) (dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis). See also Dixon, Practice and Procedure Before .the
Federal Trade Commission, 9 NEw YORK LAW FORUM 31 (1963) at p. 43:
"Like many other administrative agencies, the Federal Trade Commission
performs functions that run through the entire spectrum of investigative, prose-
cutive, and adjudicative duties. It receives complaints from members of the public
as to alleged violations of the statutes it administers; initiates investigations;
issues formal complaints charging named parties with violations of law; causes
adjudicative hearings to be held in which witnesses are heard and other evidence
is received (by independent 'hearing examiners') in support of, and against, the
charges in the complaints; hears appeals from the hearing examiners' 'initial
decisions' as to whether or not the law has been violated; issues orders command-
ing the named parties to 'cease and desist' from the violations found; and seeks
enforcement of those orders in the courts."
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mission Act, 5 the Commission was granted a right of access to records
of companies being investigated 3  and the power to compel by subpoena
testimony of witnesses and the production of documentary evidenceY
In connection with the latter provision, immunity is provided for wit-
nesses testifying in Commission proceedings. The immunity formula
worked out in Brown v. Walker served as a model for Section 9.38
The judicial decisions examining the federal antitrust witness
immunity acts have established the boundaries of immunity and have
further emphasized the important part the immunity acts play in
obtaining essential information that would otherwise be unavailable.
In 1906, the Act of February 25, 1903, was before the Supreme Court
for construction for the first time in Hale v. Henkel.39  A federal
grand jury investigating alleged Sherman Act violations subpoenaed
Hale, the secretary and treasurer of Mac Andrews & Forbes Company,
but he declined to answer questions concerning the company's business,
the location of its office, or the firm's agreements with other companies.
Witness Hale was advised of the 1903 immunity statute provision by the
Assistant District Attorney, but he still refused to answer questions.
Thereupon contempt proceedings were initiated.4 ° The Supreme Court
35. 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958). Section 9 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act is an automatic type immunity act. Under Section 9, a witness must
be testifying in obedience to a subpoena and while under oath before immunity from
subsequent prosecution is conferred. It is unnecessary for a witness to claim his
privilege before the Commission to obtain the immunity granted by Section 9. U.S. v.
Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
Section 9 immunity will not apply to an officer of a corporation required to
produce books and records of the corporation, whether the records were kept by him
or by another, United States v. Frontier Asthma Co., 69 F. Supp. 994, 996 (W.D.
N.Y. 1947), for it is well settled that the privilege against self-incrimination does
not extend to a corporation. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), note 17 supra.
Even though these records may incriminate the corporate officer who presents them,
he has no constitutional immunity in regard to such documents, Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1, 17 (1948).
36. For the purpose of examination, the Commission or its agents are provided
access to, and the right to copy any documentary evidence of any corporation being
investigated or proceeded against. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), more than
any other case formed the "raw material from which the Congress of 1914 molded the
'access' provision of the [Federal Trade Commission] Act." Mueller, Access to
Corporate Papers Under the FTC Act, 11 KAN. L. Riv. 77, 93 (1962).
37. The F.T.C. Act, 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958), provides in
pertinent part:
"No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing
documentary evidence before the commission or in obedience to the subpoena of
the commission on the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence,
documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to criminate him or subject
him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no natural person shall be prosecuted or
subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction,
matter, or thing concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence, docu-
mentary or otherwise, before the commission in obedience to a subpoena issued
by it: Provided, That no natural person so testifying shall be exempt from
prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying."
38. 161 U.S. 591 (1896). The Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 443
(1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1958), providing for immunity under the Interstate Com-
merce Act proceedings, served as a model for many immunity provisions in subsequent
regulatory measures. See Note 27 supra and accompanying text.
39. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
40. "Contempt can be generally defined as an act of disobedience or disrespect
toward a judicial or legislative body of government, or interference with its orderly
process, for which a summary punishment is exacted. In a broader, more general
view, it is a power assumed by governmental bodies to coerce cooperation, and
1965]
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sustained the lower court's ruling of contempt and construed the
language in the Act of 1903 covering "proceedings, suits, and prose-
cutions" to include testimony before a grand jury:
"While there may be some doubt whether the examination of
witnesses before a grand jury is a suit or prosecution, we have
no doubt that it is a 'proceeding' within the meaning of this pro-
viso. The word should receive as wide a construction as is
necessary to protect the witness in his disclosures, whenever such
disclosures are made in pursuance of a judicial inquiry, whether
such inquiry be instituted by a grand jury, or upon the trial of
an indictment found by them."'" (Emphasis added.)
United States v. Armour & Co.,42 decided shortly after Hale,
further shaped the profile of the Act of 1906. The Secretary of Com-
merce and Labor, in discharge of his statutory obligation to conduct
special investigations43 and in obedience to a House resolution, directed
the Commissioner of Corporations to investigate the low prices of beef
cattle. During a conference with officers of packing corporations the
Commissioner explained the purpose of the investigation, informing the
officers that he was acting independently and not in cooperation with
the Department of Justice Sherman Act investigation of the "Beef
Trust". The Commissioner's agents examined the books and papers
of the packing corporations. Subsequently, a grand jury indicted
Armour & Co. and its officers for Sherman Act violations. Defendants
pleaded immunity from prosecution on the ground that the supplying
of information to the Commissioner of Corporations brought into
operation the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903.
Judge Humphrey granted the individual defendants immunity despite
the fact that the testimony had been furnished voluntarily, unsubpoenaed
and unsworn to in a nonjudicial investigation by the Commissioner of
Corporations. 44 This decision was a severe blow to President Theodore
Roosevelt's trust busting program.45 Congress, reacting swiftly to
President Roosevelt's concern over the Armour holding, enacted the
1906 Immunity Act, which provides in part: "Under the immunity
provisions in section 32 of this title, immunity shall extend only to a
natural person who, in obedience to a subpoena, gives testimony under
oath or produces evidence, documentary or otherwise, under oath."'46
punish criticism or interference, even of a casually indirect nature." Goldfarb, THE
CONTEMPT POWER 1 (1963).
41. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66 (1906).
42. 142 Fed. 808 (N.D. Ill. 1906).
43. 32 Stat. 829 (1903), 5 U.S.C. § 604 (1964).
44. In deciding this case, the court examined Congress' purpose in enacting the
Commerce and Labor Act. The court determined after this analysis that unsubpoenaed
and unsworn testimony came within "the purposes of Congress in passing the com-
merce and labor act," and thus defendants were entitled to immunity from subsequent
prosecution. 142 Fed. 819 et seq.
45. See Message of the President, H.R. Doc. No. 706, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2.
See also remarks of Sen. Knox supporting the 1906 bill: ". . . the whole purpose of
this bill is to define the right of the witness . . .that the immunity shall only extend
to witnesses who have been subpoenaed to produce books and papers or subpoenaed
to give testimony .... " 40 CoNG. REc. 7657, 7658 (1906).
46. 34 Stat. 798 (1906), 15 U.S.C. § 33 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
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Congress has in most instances included a provision in the im-
munity acts, that no natural person shall be prosecuted or subjected
to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction,
matter, or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence."'
When a person after testifying is indicted and claims immunity, the
court must analyze whether the testimony given was substantially
connected with the crime for which immunity was claimed. A witness
obtains immunity if his testimony concerned any transaction, matter,
or thing for which he was subsequently indicted, but he is not pro-
tected from indictments which involve unrelated crimes of which he
may be guilty at the time he is compelled to testify. This qualification
limiting the scope of immunity statutes was plainly established in
Heike v. United States. 48
In that case, petitioner in response to a government subpoena
testified and produced documentary evidence before a federal grand
jury investigating transactions of the American Sugar Refining Com-
pany for violation of the Sherman Act. Subsequently, after petitioner
was indicted for revenue frauds, he claimed exemption from liability
by virtue of the Act of February 25, 1903, as amended by the Act
of June 30, 1906.49 The Supreme Court, per Holmes, J., held that
petitioner's evidence before the grand jury did not concern the present
revenue frauds. Mr. Justice Holmes reasoned that "not only was the
general subject of the former investigation wholly different, but the
specific things testified to had no connection with the facts now in
proof. . . ."" In considering whether the evidence furnished had an
incriminating effect on petitioner, Mr. Justice Holmes announced:
"When the statute speaks of testimony concerning a matter it means
concerning it in a substantial way, just as the constitutional protection
is confined to real danger and does not extend to remove possibilities
out of the ordinary course of law."51
Justice Holmes enunciated a standard for the construction of
statutory immunity provisos in discussing the Act of 1903, that has
been followed in later decisions:
". .. the obvious purpose of the statute is to make evidence
available and compulsory that otherwise could not be got. We
see no reason for supposing that the act offered a gratuity to
crime. It should be construed, so far as its words fairly allow
the construction, as coterminous with what otherwise would have
been the privilege of the person concerned. We believe its policy
47. See notes 7 and 25 supra for examples of that language.
48. 227 U.S. 131 (1913).
49. The same immunity provisions are involved in United States v. Welden, 377
U.S. 95 (1964), note 7 supra.
50. 227 U.S. at 143.
51. Id. at 144. (Emphasis added.) The qualification requiring substantial danger of
conviction from the evidence furnished has been followed in Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) ; Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1951);
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950); United States v. Cusson, 132 F.2d
413, 414 (2d Cir. 1942).
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to be the same as that of the earlier act of February 11, 1893,
c. 83, 27 Stat. 443 ... ."52
Unlike most federal witness immunity acts passed by Congress, the
immunity provisions under the antitrust laws ordinarily do not require
a witness to claim his privilege against self-incrimination. 3 Immunity
is automatically gained by a witness for all evidence produced in
obedience to a subpoena and while under oath. This type of immunity
act provision, one of two basic types, is referred to as an "automatic"
act. The other type, a "claim" act, confers immunity only after a
witness has asserted his privilege and is directed to testify.54
Prior to 1933, immunity provisions enacted by Congress did
not require a witness desiring immunity to expressly assert his consti-
tutional privilege prerequisite to establishing immunity. Beginning with
the Securities Act of 1933," 5 and in subsequent regulatory measures
containing immunity from prosecution provisions, Congress inserted
a requirement that a witness in addition to being subpoenaed and sworn
must specifically assert his constitutional privilege.5" By adding this
specific claim requirement, Congress has plainly demonstrated an inten-
tion to insure against immunity being conferred automatically, as in
earlier immunity act provisions.
After a court has considered and determined that immunity can
be conferred under the particular immunity act in question it next looks
at the immunity act provision for the answer whether immunity has
in fact accrued to the witness. Even though many federal courts had
been sharply divided on the question whether statutory immunity
may be gained by a witness without his first asserting the constitutional
privilege,57 the question did not reach the Supreme Court until 1943
in United States v. Monia.5 s
In that case a witness in response to a subpoena appeared and
testified before a grand jury inquiring into alleged Sherman Act
violations. At no time during the grand jury proceedings was the
constitutional privilege asserted by the witness. Later, when a Sherman
Act indictment relating substantially to transactions and matters testi-
52. Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, at 142 (1913).
53. The federal witness immunity statutes applicable to the antitrust laws are
as follows: 32 Stat. 904 (1903), 15 U.S.C. § 32 (1958) ; 34 Stat. 798 (1906), 15
U.S.C. § 33 (1958) ; 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958).
54. See Note, 72 YALr L.J. 1568, 1590-94, supra note 19.
55. 48 Stat. 87 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1964).
56. Beginning with the 14th of the 17 regulatory measures including immunity
provisions enacted in 1933, Congress added the requirement that immunity shall be
conferred only after a witness has asserted his privilege against self-incrimination and
is instructed to testify. For a discussion of immunity provisions contained in various
statutes establishing governmental agencies both before and after the passage of the
1903 Act, see United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 442-45 (1943) (dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
57. Compare Johnson v. United States, 5 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1925) ; United States
v. Greater New York Live Poultry C. of C., 33 F.2d 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) ; United
States v. Lay Fish Co., Inc., 13 F.2d 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1926) ; United States v. Elton,
222 Fed. 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); United States v. Skinner, 218 Fed. 870 (S.D.N.Y.
1914) ; United States v. Armour & Co., 142 Fed. 808 (N.D. Ill. 1906) ; with United
States v. Goldman, 28 F.2d 424 (D. Conn. 1928); United States v. Ward, 295 Fed.
576 (W.D. Wash. 1924) ; United States v. Moore, 15 F.2d 593 (D. Ore. 1926);
United States v. Pardue, 294 Fed. 543 (S.D. Tex. 1923).
58. 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
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fled to was returned by the grand jury, witness Monia claimed
immunity under the 1903 Immunity Act, as amended by the Act of
1906. After the District Court for Northern Illinois overruled the
Government's demurrer, direct appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.
In affirming the District Court, Mr. Justice Roberts speaking for the
Court, with Justices Frankfurter and Douglas dissenting, took the
position that under an immunity statute typified by the 1893 Inter-
state Commerce Act, 9 as modified in 1906, a claim of the privilege
against self-incrimination is not necessary to obtain immunity so long
as the formal requirements (i.e., subpoena, oath and testimony) of the
Act of 1906 are met.
Mr. Justice Roberts, commenting on the Congressional intention
not to require a claim by the witness under the 1903 immunity statute,
as amended in 1906, noted:
"The legislation involved in the instant case is plain in its terms
and, on its face, means to the laymen that if he is subpoenaed,
and sworn, and testifies, he is to have immunity. . . . That
Congress did not intend, or by the statutes in issue provide,
that, in addition, the witness must claim his privilege, seems
clear. It is not for us to add to the legislation what Congress
pretermitted." 60
After a detailed historical analysis examining statutes and de-
cisions involving federal witness immunity, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in his dissenting opinion appealed to an exchange theory of Con-
gressional intent:
"There never has been a privilege to disregard the duty to which
a subpoena calls. And when Congress turned to the device of
immunity legislation, therefore, it did not provide a 'substitute'
for the performance of the universal duty to appear as a witness
- it did not undertake to give something for nothing. It was the
refusal to give incriminating testimony for which Congress bar-
gained, and not the refusal to give any testimony. And it was
only in exchange for the self-incriminating testimony which 'other-
wise could not be got' (Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131,
142) because of the witness's invocation of his constitutional
rights that Congress conferred immunity against the use of such
testimony."6
Mr. Justice Holmes in Heike enunciated the same theory. Under
this theory, instead of presuming an intention on the part of the
witness to assert his privilege, Justice Frankfurter would require a
valid claim to establish the privilege. To Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
"an appearance in response to a subpoena does not of itself confer
immunity from prosecution for anything that a witness so respond-
ing may testify. There must be conscious surrender of the privilege
59. See note 25 supra.
60. 317 U.S. at 430.
61. Id. at 433.
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of silence in the course of a testimonial inquiry. Of course no
form of words is necessary to claim one's privilege. Circumstances
may establish such a claim. But there must be some manifestation
of surrender of the privilege."
62
After United States v. Monia in 1943, the Supreme Court did not
again have an immunity question involving the Act of February 25,
1903, as amended in 1906,6" before it until United States v. Welden.
A subcommittee of the House Select Committee on Small Business
investigating practices in the dairy industry subpoenaed William C.
Welden to testify and produce documents belonging to a corporation,
H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., of which he was an officer.64 In obedience to
the subpoena Welden testified before the subcommittee on February 18
and 19, 1960. Subsequently, on September 6, 1960, Welden and four
other individuals and three corporations, including H. P. Hood &
Sons, Inc., were indicted on charges of conspiring to fix milk prices and
to defraud the United States, in violation of the Sherman Act6 5 and
the Conspiracy Act.66 Welden moved to dismiss on the ground, inter
alia, that prosecution was barred under the immunity provision of the
Act of February 25, 1903,' because his testimony previously given be-
fore the House subcommittee concerned transactions, matters, and
things covered by the indictment. The United States District Court,
District of Massachusetts, in Memorandum and Order held that the
immunity provision of 15 U.S.C. §32 barred prosecution of Welden.6 s
The Government's position, that testimony before a congressional com-
mittee is not given in "a proceeding . . . under (the antitrust laws)"
within the meaning of the immunity provision of the 1903 statute
and extends only to judicial proceedings, was rejected. The District
Court Judge reasoned that to hold otherwise "would fly in the face
of traditional American notion of fair play. . . and subject a defendant
to stand trial for conduct about which he has been compelled to testify
by the subpoena power of a Congressional Subcommittee."6 On direct
appeal to the Supreme Court,7" the District Court was reversed, with
Justices Black and Douglas dissenting.7
62. Id. at 446-47.
63. See note 7 supra.
64. The Select Committee had been authorized by the House to study and in-
vestigate the problems of all types of small business (H. Rns. 51, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess., 105 CoNG. Rxc. 1785) and its chairman appointed the Special Subcommittee to
study the problems of small business in the dairy industry (H.R. RP. 714, 86th Cong.,
Ist Sess.). Welden's testimony is set forth in Hearings before the Special Subcom-
mittee of the Select Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess., Part IV, pp. 665-701.
65. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
66. 62 Stat. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1958).
67. See note 7 supra. Rules applicable to the investigative powers of Congress are
set forth in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
68. United States v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 656 (D. Mass. 1963).
69. Id. at 657.
70. Direct appeal by the Government was pursuant to the Criminals Appeals Act,
62 Stat. 844 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1958). The Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction, 375 U.S. 809 (1963).
71. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court's judgment dismissing the
indictment against Welden and remanded the case. On remand, Welden pleaded nolo
contendere and was fined $2,500.00.
[VOL. XXV
CONGRESSIONAL BUSINESS INQUIRY
The Supreme Court majority disagreed with the District Court's
decision that the immunity provision of the 1903 statute is applicable to
persons testifying before congressional committees and subcommittees.
Petitioner argued that the immunity provision of the Act of 1903 was
amended by implication by the Act of 1906 to extend immunity to
persons testifying in nonjudicial proceedings. This interpretation was
unanimously rejected by the Court. Mr. Justice Goldberg, writing for
the majority, examined the legislative history of the 1903 statute, as
amended in 1906, and applicable decisions, and held that the statute
granted immunity only to persons testifying in judicial proceedings
brought under specific acts, such as the Sherman Act. The Court
concluded, "that the 1906 statute did not, either expressly or implicitly,
extend the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, to
include nonjudicial proceedings. The 1906 Act simply limited im-
munity to persons testifying under oath and in response to subpoena.
' '7 2
Justice Goldberg emphasized that:
"Congress has extended immunity, with careful safeguards, to
persons testifying before congressional committees in certain
limited situations not here involved. Where Congress, however,
has limited immunity to persons testifying in judicial proceed-
ings, as it has plainly done here, it is not for the courts to extend
the scope of the immunity."'
Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion, agreed that the Act of
1906 did not enlarge the reach of the Act of February 25, 1903, to
include nonjudicial proceedings. However, he viewed the Act of 1903
as applying to nonjudicial proceedings without enlargement of its
scope. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Black referred to the Senate
debates on the 1906 immunity act:
". .. in the Senate debate on the 1906 amendment, Senator
Daniel expressed an understanding which no one questioned:
'I suppose that the bill under consideration as it reads now
applies only to persons who testify in a judicial proceeding
or to those who are responding to some body such as a
Congressional committee that has the right to enforce an
answer from a witness.'
Senator Knox, manager of the amendment in the Senate, there-
upon explained the bill to Senator Daniel in detail, never contra-
dicting what Senator Daniel had said on this point. . . . From
that day until this no one seems ever to have doubted that this
reading of the 1903 Antitrust Immunity Act was correct."1
7 4
Mr. Justice Black felt that a "narrow and grudging interpreta-
tion of the Act is ... not justified by either the language or the history
72. United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 107 (1964).
73. Id. at 107.
74. Id. at 113.
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of the legislation. ' 7 5 Moreover, in harmony with his views set forth
in prior dissenting opinions,7 6 he considered the Government under an
obligation not to breach a solemn promise of immunity protection con-
ferred upon individuals by Congress pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §32.
Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent attacked the evils and harmful indi-
vidual indignities of "legislative trials". He declared:
"Congressional investigations as they have evolved, are in practice(proceedings' of a grave nature so far as individual liberties are
concerned. Not all committee hearings are 'trials' of the witness;
not all committee hearings are televised or broadcast; and so far
as appear this witness was not subjected to any such ordeal ...
But courts, knowing the manner in which committees often
operate, are properly alert either in denying legal effect to what
has been done or in taking other steps protective of the rights
of the accused.... That is one reason why I would not import any
ambiguities into this Immunity Act to this disadvantage of the
accused."
77
In conclusion, Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
"Some may see wisdom in this modern kind of 'trial by committee,'
so to speak, with committees and prosecutors competing for victims.
But the more I see of the awesome power of government to ruin
people, to drive them from public life, to brand them forever as
undesirable, the deeper I feel that protective measures are needed.
I speak now not of constitutional power, but of the manner in
which a statute should be read. I therefore incline to construe the
Immunity Act freely to hold that he who runs the gantlet of a
committee cannot be 'tried' again."17
With an examination of the Welden decision completed it is now
appropriate to focus attention on two Supreme Court decisions decided
since Welden involving the privilege against self-incrimination and
state witness immunity acts. Implications of these two decisions, Malloy
v. Hogan" and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York
Harbor,"0 have a substantial effect on the dual enforcement of the
antitrust laws when considered in light of Welden.
Malloy firmly established that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is safeguarded from Federal encroachment by the Fifth Amend-
ment and insulated against state invasion by the Fourteenth. Ad-
75. Id. at 108.
76. See Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 367 (dissenting opinion)(1963); Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 124 (dlis-
senting opinion) (1960).
77. United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, at 116.
78. Id. at 123.
79. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The Court as per Breman, J., reconsidered prior decisionsholding that the privilege against self-incrimination is not protected against state
action by the Fourteenth Amendment. This was a 5-4 decision.
80. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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ditionally, availability of the privilege to a witness in state inquiries
is determined by the same standard applicable in federal proceedings."'
The Supreme Court, on the same day as the Malloy decision,
held in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor that
where a witness has been given a statutory grant of immunity from
prosecution under the laws of a state sovereignty, he cannot be prose-
cuted on the basis of his testimony (or its fruits) under the federal
laws. 2 As an obvious corollary to this decision, a state would be
barred from using testimony (or its fruits) which has been federally
immunized as a basis for a subsequent state prosecution.
Mr. Justice Goldberg, writing for the majority in Murphy, con-
sidered the policies of the Fifth Amendment protection and then re-
viewed prior English and American decisions.8 3 Many of these early
decisions were based upon the principle that the state and federal
governments operate as separate and distinct sovereignties and each
acts independently of the other. Thus, immunity granted by state
statute depends only on whether that statute confers complete pro-
tection against prosecution in the state courts. If it does, refusal
to answer on the ground of self-incrimination does not exist. In con-
cluding, Mr. Justice Goldberg declared: "We hold that the constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness against
incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal witness
against incrimination under state as well as federal law."8 4
Applying Malloy v. Hogan to this case, Mr. Justice Goldberg stated:
"[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness
may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incrimi-
nating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its
fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in con-
nection with a criminal prosecution against him."8 5
The federal antitrust laws had their antecedents in the early de-
cisions of the state courts and the enactments of state legislatures.8 6
Most states have enacted antitrust laws with the same general objectives
as the federal antitrust laws.8 7  Because of the overlapping juris-
81. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
82. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). States have enacted immunity acts to obtain testimony
that otherwise would not be available under the constitutional privilege. Similar to
the federal immunity acts, the state immunity statutes involve all proceedings where
testimony of a witness might serve to incriminate him.
83. Id. at 55-77. Whereas in the Welden decision Mr. Justice Goldberg did not
examine the Fifth Amendment safeguard in writing the majority opinion, in this
decision he referred at length to the principles underlying the constitutional protection.
84. Id. at 77-78.
85. Id. at 79.
86. Wilson, The State Antitrust Laws, 47 A.B.A.J. 160 (1961) ; see also address
by Commissioner E. MacIntyre before House of Representatives, State of Hawaii,
on Federal-State Cooperation Regarding Antitrust and Trade Regulation, August, 1962.
87. For a compilation of the state antitrust laws, see 1 MARKETING LAW SURVEY,
STATE ANTITRUST LAWS (U.S. Govt. Printing Office 1940). For a discussion com-
paring California's laws with the federal laws, see Von Kalinowski & Hanson, The
California Antitrust Laws: A Comparison with the Federal Antitrust Laws, 6
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 533-59 (1959). See also SrAT ANTITRUST LAW RIFERENcE HAND-
BOOK (Dept. of Justice 1960) ; and Report of Special Comm. to Study the New York
Antitrust Laws, Annex I at 65(a) (1957).
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diction in the enforcement of these laws, the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, as repre-
sentatives of the federal government, have encouraged state agencies
to cooperate in the over-all enforcement of the antitrust laws."
In light of the Murphy case, it may be said that congressional
immunity grants bar the use of that testimony or its fruit in subsequent
federal or state prosecutions. The federal authorities may prosecute
following such testimony only after they have met "the burden of
showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they
had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence." 9
The congressional subcommittee examining Welden did not have
statutory authority to confer immunity upon him. The 1903 Im-
munity Act applies only to persons testifying and judicial proceedings,
and not to persons giving testimony before congressional committees. 90
Therefore under the Welden situation a witness who testifies is subject
to either federal or state prosecution. A witness in such a position
is justified in refusing to answer any questions because of the chance
of exposing himself to the hazards of prosecution by federal or state
enforcement agencies.
There is little doubt that the Welden decision will impair future
congressional committees investigating business practices. Similarly,
the value to the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice of the
testimony of congressional witnesses has been seriously diminished.
A corporate witness summoned by a committee to answer questions
concerning his company's business practices is not likely to waive his
constitutional privilege, where his disclosures may lead to his self-
incrimination. Instead, the corporate witness will assert his privilege
against self-incrimination and remain silent rather than chance subse-
quent prosecution.
As a result of Welden the Antitrust Division may well be forced
to rely mainly on its own investigation techniques without further
assistance from testimony before congressional committees. In the
past the Antitrust Division has made the most significant use of the
federal antitrust witness immunity acts. This is attributable to the
fact that the immunity acts involved in all federal judicial proceedings
under the antitrust laws are automatic in character.' A detailed
procedure for considering whether a person should be granted immunity
has been formulated by the Division. Generally, immunity grants
88. Sieker, The Role of the States in Antitrust Law Enforcement - Some Views
and Observations, 39 Tnx. L. Rtv. 873 (1961). An example of a step recently made
to encourage state antitrust activity was the policy under Assistant Attorney General
Robert A. Bicks of facilitating prosecution of damage claims based upon collusive
bidding to governmental agencies by refusing to acquiesce in nolo contendere pleas
and refusing to enter into consent decrees without a provision restraining defendants
from denying their violations in a civil damage suit brought by a public agency, based
upon the same violation which is the subject of the prosecution. The effect of this
"Asphalt Clause" is that injured public litigants can use the consent decree as they
would a guilty plea as prima facie proof of guilt. United States v. Lake Asphalt and
Petroleum Co., 1960 Trade Cas. 1 69,835 (D. Mass. 1960).
89. 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964).
90. United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95 (1964).
91. See note 53 supra.
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are avoided for persons primarily responsible for antitrust violations. 2
Since immunity is automatic under the antitrust acts, the Govern-
ment on occasion will ask a witness to waive his immunity prior to his
appearance before the grand jury. Agreeing to such waiver is rarely
advantageous to a witness.9 3
The Division is also involved in proceedings before other regula-
tory agencies whose actions may have an impact upon the enforcement
of the antitrust laws. 4 Because of the overlapping jurisdiction of the
Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission in the enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws, a working arrangement exists between
the two agencies. 5
The Welden decision is not expected to affect the availability of
corporate records and papers to congressional committees. It is well
settled that the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to
corporations. Consequently, a corporate officer summoned by a con-
gressional committee to produce corporate records and papers has no
constitutional immunity as to those records even though they may
incriminate him, and thus the officer may not refuse to produce the
records for the committee. However, the officer may invoke the consti-
tutional privilege against self-incrimination when the committee seeks
92. See Kramer, Criminal Prosecutions for Violations of the Sherman Act: In
Search of a Policy, 48 Gro. L. Rzv. 530 (1960).
93. See Address by George D. Reycraft, Former Chief of Section Operations,
Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, delivered at the 1963 N.Y. State Bar Asso-
ciation Antitrust Law Symposium, reprinted by CCH Trade Cases, p. 73 (1963).
94. See Address by William H. Orrick, Jr., August 12, 1963, before the Antitrust
Section of the American Bar Association.
95. Recently, Antitrust Division investigative tools were implemented by legisla-
tion authorizing the use of a civil investigative demand under the Antitrust Civil
Process Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 548-551 (1962), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1962). The
Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division
may serve a civil demand on any corporation, association, partnership or other legal
entity not a natural person for the production of documentary evidence relating to
investigations of suspected civil antitrust violations. It is similar to a subpoena and
its validity is determined under the rules applicable to a subpoena duces tecum served
in a grand jury investigation. H.R. Ri.m No. 1386 (S. 167), 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
It may be enforced by compulsory court procedure.
Even though it is to be used only in civil investigations, this does not mean
information obtained may not be used in criminal proceedings. Evidence secured from
the examination of books and records of a company served with a civil investigative
demand can be presented before a grand jury investigating criminal antitrust violations.
Under the Antitrust Civil Process Act of 1962 natural persons are specifically
exempted. Company books and records are subject to Antitrust Division examina-
tion. However, the Act does not authorize oral examination of company officials.
beyond the establishment of the identity and authenticity of the records produced. In
the event of questions probing beyond that scope, the official may invoke his constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination. Since the purpose of the Act is not designed
to compel testimony, no provision for conferring immunity upon a witness was included.
Therefore, any responses by company officials may be considered a waiver of the
privilege and could expose them to subsequent prosecution.
Prior to the enactment of the Antitrust Civil Process Act of 1962 the Antitrust
Division possessed no compulsory method by which information concerning a civil
antitrust violation could be obtained. The act thus implements the Division's three
principal investigative techniques: the preliminary inquiry by Division attorneys, grandjury proceedings and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) inquiries.
See Petition of Union Oil Co., 225 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Calif. 1963), aff'd sub norn
United States v. Union Oil Co., 343 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1965) ; and Petition of Gold
Bond Stamp Co., 221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963), aff'd sub nom Gold Bond Stamp
Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964).
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testimony beyond identification and authentication of the records pro-
duced. The committee cannot then compel the officer to answer further
questions because immunity from subsequent prosecution cannot be
conferred.
CONCLUSION
Availability of accurate current business information is extremely
important for the furtherance of legislative surveillance over the anti-
trust laws and trade regulatory acts. Thus, the free submission to
congressional committees of necessary information has been seriously
jeopardized as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Welden.
Implications of the Welden case now particularly impair the working
relationship existing between Congress and businessmen witnesses,
by discouraging the flow of information from the business community.
Obviously, a witness apprehensive of antitrust act prosecution will
not make a conscientious all-out effort to cooperate with Congress.
Resort to immunity statutes seems to have proved itself a valuable and
satisfactory aid in obtaining reliable information. The Welden de-
cision made it clear that a promise of immunity from subsequent prose-
cution its not available under the Immunity Act of 1903, as amended
by the Act of 1906, to subpoenaed witnesses testifying (under oath)
in nonjudicial proceedings.
To the dissenters, Black and Douglas, the Welden decision presents
not only a legal issue but a moral question as well. In fact, it would
appear that the majority of the Supreme Court invited Congress to
act in this regard when it suggested, "Where Congress, however, has
limited immunity to persons testifying in judicial proceedings, as it
has plainly done here, it is not for the courts to extend the scope
of immunity."96 Legislation is necessary not only to maintain the
effectiveness of the information flowing into Congress, but also in
order to correct a departure from our traditions of fair play, enunciated
in the District Court opinion in Welden and in the Supreme Court
dissents.
Absent any legislative correction of the situation resulting from
the Supreme Court's Welden decision, a congressional committee
witness is confronted with these alternatives:
1. Continuing to cooperate fully by testifying before congressional
committees: This is unlikely because, if the witness testifies, he runs
the risk of having his testimony used or provided as a link in a chain
of evidence that may be used against him in a subsequent prosecution
by the enforcement agencies.
2. Refusing to cooperate except for producing subpoenaed docu-
ments: This would tend to impede the flow of information to Congress.
Many witnesses now will assert their constitutional privilege and re-
fuse to testify because immunity cannot be exchanged for evidence
that could not otherwise be obtained by the congressional body. Thus
Congress would be forced to abandon the attempt to extract informa-
tion from unwilling witnesses.
96. United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 107 (1964).
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3. Continuing to cooperate fully by testifying after first request-
ing Congress to promise to recommend to the enforcement agencies
that because of a witness' cooperation, the agencies involved not prose-
cute the witness: This appears impractical. Even if a congressional
committee should make such a promise to recommend that no prose-
cution be made, the agencies are not legally bound and still may
in congressional proceedings.
Clearly, none of these alternatives is satisfactory. The only satis-
factory remedy to the Welden decision is the enactment of corrective
legislation to relieve congressional witnesses testifying before com-
mittees investigating business practices of any risk of being subse-
quently prosecuted for antitrust violations if they should cooperate
and testify. To achieve this objective, the 1903 Immunity Act, amended
in 1906, should again be amended to provide for witness immunity
in Congressional proceedings.
It would appear that the antitrust enforcement agencies really
have not gained from the Welden decision. And from a practical
working viewpoint, such an amendment to the 1903 Immunity Act
will not grant some new cloak of privilege to congressional witnesses,
to the disadvantage of the antitrust enforcement agencies. Both the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission presently have available adequate investigative tools for
obtaining information and any legislation granting immunity to con-
gressional witnesses does not seem likely to impede their investigative
powers.
Enactment of an amendment to the 1903 Immunity Act should
recognize and confer immunity only to a witness testifying in response
to a subpoena and while under oath before congressional committees
inquiring into business practices. Immunity conferred by this amend-
ment should be automatic in character. Thus, before issuance of a
subpoena requiring testimony, congressional committees will have
to determine whether the information a witness can offer is valuable
enough to warrant granting immunity. Relieved of the apprehension
of subsequent indictment, private citizens will then be in a position
to cooperate with Congress. The working relationship that existed
between Congress and the business community will be restored, and
Congress may again expect to be the recipient of reliable current infor-
mation essential for its surveillance over the antitrust laws and trade
regulatory acts.
1965]
